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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DANIEL B. MCCORVEY,

:
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:
Case No. 910054

v.
:

STATE OF UTAH. DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION: and LeGRAND
JOHNSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation,
Defendants and
Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Priority No. 16

:
t
*

OPENING BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is a cross-appeal and appeal1 from the denial of a motion
for new trial and from a judgment in favor of Plaintiff/Appellant
Daniel B. McCorvey entered upon a $5.4 million jury verdict in a
personal

injury action.

Original appellate

jurisdiction

is

conferred on the Utah Supreme Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)(j) (Supp. 1991) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (Supp. 1991).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL
1.

Was the evidence insufficient as a matter of law to

establish that the omissions from UDOT's traffic control plan were

*The parties have stipulated to a consolidated briefing
schedule in which the Utah Department of Transportation, although
technically the cross-appellant, agreed to file the opening brief.
Another cross-appeal filed by the codefendant, LeGrand Construction
Company, was dismissed in this Court's August 5, 1991 order, based
on the agreement of McCorvey and LeGrand Construction Company.

a substantial cause of injury incurred by McCorvey when he lost
control of his car on a newly resurfaced highway lane, even if they
were a cause-in-fact?

Is the intervening conduct of either the

contractor, who left excess gravel chips in that lane, or of
McCorvey and another driver, who engaged in a high speed road race
through the lane resurfacing zone, a superseding cause of injury to
McCorvey as a matter of law?
2.
special

Viewing the evidence in a light favorable to the jury's
verdict

finding

McCorvey

negligent,

is

it

legally

insufficient to support the jury's finding that UDOT, in adopting
a traffic control plan that did not make this side-by-side road
race physically impossible, was more at fault than McCorvey, who
raced through a highway resurfacing zone and illegally tried to
pass another at speeds in excess of posted limits and too fast for
known and apparent hazardous conditions?
3.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying UDOT

a new trial after giving a "sudden peril" instruction that is
improper and prejudicial in Utah's comparative fault system since
it

unfairly

comments

on

the

evidence,

implies

that

normal

negligence principles do not apply to plaintiff, and tends to
excuse his negligence or culpability in the eyes of a jury?
event, was

it prejudicial

error to give the

In any

"sudden peril"

instruction in this case because there was no evidence of any
sudden emergency not caused by McCorvey himself?

2

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Jury

verdicts

are

upheld

on

appeal

if

there

is

any

substantial, competent evidence upon which a jury acting fairly and
reasonably could make the challenged factual finding.
Gentile,

813

P.2d

111,

114

(Utah

1991).

In

Reeves v.

making

this

determination, the appellate court views the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict. Rees v. Intermountain Health Care,
Inc.,

808 P.2d 1069, 1072 (Utah 1991); Cambelt Int'l Corp. v.

Dalton. 745 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Utah 1987).

With regard to UDOT's

insufficiency claims in Points I and II, the appellate court must
consider whether the evidence so clearly preponderates in favor of
a finding that UDOT's negligence was not a proximate cause of harm
to McCorvey or that UDOT was less at fault than McCorvey that
reasonable people would not differ on the question.

See

Cambelt,

745 P.2d at 1242; Reeves, 813 P.2d at 114 (no substantial evidence
if finding is so plainly unreasonable that no jury acting fairly
and reasonably could make it). Finally, this court can reverse the
trial court's denial of the motion

for new trial, based on

prejudicial error resulting from the sudden peril jury instruction,
if the denial constituted an abuse of discretion, i.e., if there
was no reasonable basis for the denial, or if the denial was based
on erroneous legal principles or findings without record support.
Crooks ton v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 805 & n.19 (Utah
1991).

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Introduction
This personal injury action arises from a one-car rollover on
1-15 just south of the 1-70 Cove Fort interchange in Millard
County, Utah, that occurred in the late afternoon of August 7,
1986. Thirty-year-old Daniel B. McCorvey was driving his new 1986
Honda CRX on a southbound stretch of divided highway that was being
resurfaced with gravel chips by defendant LeGrand Construction
Company ("LeGrand") under contract with defendant Utah Department
of Transportation ("UDOT").

McCorvey, travelling 60-65 mph (R.

3007 at 77; R. 3002 at 55, 61) in a lane resurfaced twq days before
by the project's contractor (Ex. 20; R. 2998 at 30), lost control
of the five-speed sports car in a patch of thick gravel and veered
off the left shoulder of the inside southbound lane into the grassy
median

(R. 3003 at 84).

Just before his car left the road,

McCorvey had accelerated and pulled ahead to pass a van driven by
Paul Wayne Wright (R. 3003 at 102; R. 3007 at 143, 154),
The Wright van had come up behind McCorvey at 65-75 mph, then
tried to jockey ahead of him by passing in the more recently
resurfaced, unswept, right hand lane of traffic, throwing up loose
gravel (R. 3004 at 6-10, 36-39; R. 3003 at 105). McCorvey's car
flipped and rolled several times in the median when he tried to
steer back onto the highway instead of braking or slowing to a stop
there, and he and his passenger, Vaun Page, were ejected. Both men
were seriously injured.

McCorvey, previously an active cyclist,

airplane pilot, sailor, and scuba diver (R. 3000 at 100), was
4

rendered a quadriplegic in nearly constant pain who requires roundthe-clock care (R. 2998 at 7, 18; R. 3003 at 7, 56).
B. The Chip Seal Process
The chip sealing technique used in this highway resurfacing
project is common in Utah and elsewhere. First, 2" high reflector
tabs are put in the roadway to serve as temporary lane markers (R.
3004 at 151; Ex. 239).

Next, a layer of asphalt emulsion is

sprayed onto a section of one highway lane by a distributor (R.
3004 at 200), followed immediately by the "chip box," a machine
that puts down a thick layer of loose gravel chips and evenly
spreads them in a swath 13.5 feet wide.

A heavy, .rubber-tired

machine with a roller the width of one lane follows and then twice
rolls the lane longitudinally to push the chips into the sticky
emulsion (R. 3007 at 39; R. 3004 at 226).

In all chip sealing,

more gravel chips than can possibly stick are deliberately laid
down at first so the chips that eventually do adhere will be as
densely spaced as possible, ultimately leaving a smooth rock
surface (R. 3004 at 150; Unnumbered Transcript of November 20, 1990
at 8-9).

The newly chipped roadway is broomed as necessary with a

large sweeper that removes the surplus loose chips that remain
after rolling (R. 3004 at 165).

Normal highway traffic is used as

the final step in the chip resealing process.

It is usually

allowed back onto the lane 2-3 hours after rolling (Transcript of
November 20, 1990 at 14).

The gravel chips eventually become

firmly imbedded into the emulsion to form a smooth new road surface
as cars travel repeatedly over them (R. 3007 at 28).

5

C. The Cove Fort Project
In May 1986, the resurfacing project at issue in this case,
the Cove Fort Project, was let out for bid by UDOT, which is
responsible for maintaining the interstate highways.

The project

consisted of the chip resealing of thirty-four miles of 1-15 and I70. On 1-15, the twelve-mile long project site ran from milemarker
144 south past the hilltop Dog Valley rest area at milemarker 136,
continuing south past the 1-70 Cove Fort interchange, down to
milemarker 132 (R. 3004 at 142-44).2

Special Provision 405.09 of

the project's plans required the contractor to submit a traffic
control plan, prior to doing the resurfacing work, fo^ approval by
UDOT's project engineer (Ex. 8 at 15), Richard Griffin. In the bid
packet given to prospective bidders, UDOT included a copy of a
traffic control plan (Ex. 10, Addendum Item B) for the bidder's
consideration (R. 2998 at 28). LeGrand's bid was accepted and it
entered into a contract with UDOT incorporating the project bid
specifications and special provisions (Exs. 7, 8, Addendum Items C
and D). LeGrand's vice-president notified project engineer Griffin
in late July that LeGrand intended to use the traffic control plan
that was included in the project bid packet and added, "We have
reviewed this with our personnel and feel it is adequate for safety
of employees as well as the travelling public on this particular
project."

(Ex. 72, Addendum Item E).

2

The critical section of the project from milemarker 137 south
to milemarker 134 is shown in Ex. 115, which also shows the drop in
elevation on southbound 1-15 at these points. A reduced copy of
Ex. 115 is included as Item A in a separately bound Addendum to
Opening Brief of Cross-Appellant Utah Department of Transportation.

6

The approved traffic control plan called for rectangular "DO
NOT PASS NEXT 15 MILES" signs at the beginning of this resurfacing
project, which was on the southbound lanes of 1-15 at milemarker
144 (R 3004 at 168). The next signs a motorist would come to were:
"ROADWORK AHEAD" signs on either side of the southbound lanes; 500'
beyond this, "RIGHT [or LEFT] LANE CLOSED AHEAD" signs; and 500'
beyond, "LOOSE GRAVEL" signs.

This trio of diamond-shaped, black

on orange advance signs could not be placed more than five miles
ahead of the ongoing chip sealing.
PASS"

signs were

to be affixed

Next, black on white "DO NOT
to the

top

of

the

roadway

delineators (posts with amber reflectors) on both sides of the road
at approximately one mile intervals (Ex. 10, Addendum Item B; R.
3004 at 170).

At approximately 1000' before the first piece of

working chipping machinery, there was to be an early warner sign in
the closed lane of traffic where chipping was going on, with a
black on white 25 mph regulatory speed limit sign.3

The early

warner (shown in photo Ex. 58, Addendum Item F) is a large sign
with a flashing series of lights in an arrow shape that points to
the unclosed lane.

It is on wheels so it can be moved with the

chipping machinery as resurfacing progresses down a section of
highway lane.

The last sign on the traffic control plan is one

that says "END CONSTRUCTION," placed where drivers would pass the

3

The 25 mph signs actually used on the Cove Fort project were
black on orange, not black on white (R. 3004 at 171). A black on
white sign is regulatory, meaning it must be complied with by
drivers, while a black on orange speed limit sign is advisory only
(R. 2998 at 221-222; R. 3004 at 219).

7

last piece of chipping machinery (Ex. 10, Addendum Item B).
The traffic control plan said nothing about whether LeGrand
was required to keep a newly chipped portion of a lane closed to
normal traffic until after the surplus chips had been swept; UDOT
Project Engineer Griffin said once it was rolled, a lane could be
reopened to travel by LeGrand (R. 3004 at 190-91).

Section 405.09

of the State of Utah's Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge
Construction (1979 ed.) required the contractor to reopen a lane
after rolling (Ex. 110; R. 3000 at 67).

According to Griffin,

given the choice of two open lanes, one swept and one unswept, most
drivers would choose the better, swept lane (R. 3004vat 227).
The approved traffic control plan did not address restriction
of the speed that traffic could travel on a reopened, newly
chipped, but unswept lane (R. 3004 at 191, 198). Although the "DO
NOT PASS" signs remained in place when a newly chipped lane was
reopened, the early warners with the 25 mph speed limit signs were
to be on the highway only so long as there was actual chipping work
going on (R. 3004 at 193). They were to be pulled off the highway
once rolling of the chips was finished

(R. 3004 at 191-93).

Griffin considered the regular 55 mph speed limit safe even prior
to sweeping in light of the "LOOSE GRAVEL" warning signs and the
regulatory "DO NOT PASS" signs to limit windshield damage, as well
as the presence of the gravel chips themselves, which make a
increasingly loud rumbling and rattling sound as a car moves faster
over them (R. 3004 at 198, 219-22; R. 2998 at 206). All of these
would alert reasonable drivers to the condition of the road and
8

allow them to reduce their speed to fit the existing conditions (R.
3004 at 221-22).

Peter Holtan, who designs work zone traffic

control plans for UDOT, agreed that in chip seal projects a traffic
control planner takes into account the existing hazard that is
apparent to drivers from the sight and sounds of loose gravel and
their normal reactions to them

(R. 2998 at 206-07).

These

conditions control traffic even if there are no warning signs
posted (R. 2998 at 206).
The actual spreading of gravel chips began on the Cove Fort
project on Friday, August lf 1986, when both lanes of southbound I15 from milemarker 142 to 138 were spread with chipsf rolled, and
swept (Ex. 20 at 2). Griffin visited the inactive project site on
Sunday, August 3.

He calculated that too much gravel was being

laid down and concluded that the "LOOSE GRAVEL" and "ROADWORK
AHEAD" signs were too far in advance of where the actual chipping
operation was going on because traffic was not slowing down until
it actually came upon the new chips (R. 3004 at 173-75, 178-79,
188-89).

These concerns were relayed in a memo (Ex. 11, Addendum

Item G) to Curtis Berry, the UDOT inspector who was on the project
site each day

(R. 3005 at 89).

Griffin suggested

that the

contractor chip only one lane each day, instead of both lanes in
one day, in order to reduce the number of chips being pulled up by
normal traffic and flipped over before the emulsion hardened (Ex.
11; R. 3004 at 234-36).
Griffin learned on August 4 at the project site that he had
miscalculated the amount of gravel spread on August 1; the actual
9

amount was much less, within contract specifications, and the chip
spreader was fine tuned on August 4 to distribute 23 pounds of
chips per square yard (R. 3004 at 193-94, 231-32; R. 3005 at 105).
The "LOOSE GRAVEL" and "ROADWORK AHEAD" signs were thereafter moved
up closer to the actual chipping operations (R. 3004 at 234-35).
Both lanes of southbound 1-15 were chipped from milemarker 144
to 141.4 on August 4 and from milemarker 137.9 to 136.2 on August
5 (Ex. 20).

The inside (left) southbound lane from milemarker

136.2 to 133 was chipped, rolled, and swept on August 5 (Ex. 20; R.
2998 at 30).A On August 6, the ramps of the Dog Valley interchange
were chipped.

On August 7, first the outside (rightj southbound

lane from milemarker 136.2 to 133 was chipped, then both southbound
lanes from milemarker 133 to 132.

Chipping then continued that

afternoon on the ramps of the Cove Fort interchange at milemarker
135.

The inside (left) lane of 1-15 had been rolled and swept by

the time of McCorvey's accident.

The section of the outside

(right) lane from milemarker 136 downhill to milemarker 133 had
been rolled, but LeGrand's project supervisor, Steven Peterson, was
unsure how much of this section had been swept (R. 2998 at 30). On
August 8, the chipping operation was to proceed on the northbound
lanes of 1-15.
D. The Accident
The late afternoon of August 7, 1986, was clear, hot and
sunny.

C. Dewey Taylor was southbound on 1-15 pulling a trailer

* The accident occurred at milemarker 134.2.
Item A.
10

See Addendum

with his GMC Suburban.

As he approached the project site in the

outside (right) lane, he passed a sign 300-400 yards before the
hilltop Dog Valley rest area (at milemarker 136.5) that warned of
the construction zone and the danger of windshield damage and
advised a 25 mph speed limit. He slowed to 20-30 mph because there
were heavy gravel chips in both lanes. Several cars passed him on
the left, including the McCorvey Honda travelling 50-60 mph,
throwing up chips (R. 3009 at 102-04, 114, 120). A van driven by
Paul Wayne Wright next came up behind Taylor going too fast; Taylor
pulled over into the left lane to keep the van from passing. Three
or four times, Wright pulled over into the right lane, then back
into the left, but Taylor moved in front of the van each time to
keep it from passing.

At the crest of the hill

(at about

milemarker 136.3), Wright accelerated to 60 mph behind Taylor in
the left lane and pulled out onto the left shoulder to pass Taylor.
At that point, Taylor moved to the right and let the van pass. In
doing so, with two of its wheels on the left shoulder, Wright's van
threw up gravel chips that broke Taylor's windshield (R. 3009 at
105).

Because of the chips on the roadway, Taylor would have

slowed down to 25 mph even if there had been no warnings signs; in
his

opinion,

Wright

and

McCorvey

were

both

travelling

at

unreasonably high speeds for the road conditions (R. 3009 at 11922).5
Semi driver Edward Villareal also was southbound on the same
5

Minutes later, at the accident scene, Taylor confronted
Wright, saying "I should have run you off the road. Can't you guys
understand that it said no passing?" (R. 3009 at 105).
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stretch of 1-15 late that afternoon. The McCorvey Honda passed him
before they reached the project site.

Villareal moved back into

the inside (left) lane and then slowed to 40 mph once within the
project site. Several impatient drivers tried to pass him by using
the outside (right) lane, throwing up gravel.

At the hilltop Dog

Valley rest area at milemarker 136.5, after passing through miles
of chipped surface, Wright passed Villareal on the right doing 70
mph,

throwing

up gravel

that broke a window

in the truck.

Villareal watched down the straight stretch of highway as the
Wright van first moved back into the inside (left) lane and pulled
up behind the McCorvey Honda in that lane, doing 70-75 mph, then
moved to the outside (right) lane.

As Wright pulled alongside

McCorvey, Villareal said the Honda "gave a little wiggle" and
veered off the highway toward the center median at the 134.2
milemarker. Villareal saw no brake lights on the Honda or the van.
(R. 3004 at 6-10, 20, 36-39).
Paul Wayne Wright followed behind McCorvey in the inside
(left) lane going past the rest area at milemarker 136.5 and for a
ways down the hill.6

At a 1988 deposition, Wright's wife said

McCorvey's Honda went back and forth twice onto the gravel on the
shoulder of the inside lane, throwing up gravel as it did; the
Honda's wheels were just outside the lane a tire's width (R. 3007

6

A flagger just south of the Cove Fort overpass at milemarker
135 saw McCorvey coming down the hill too fast and stepped out*into
the outside lane a bit to slow him down (R. 3007 at 56-57). The
Honda just went around him, with Page and McCorvey looking at the
flagger and mimicking him as they passed, and did not slow down (R.
3007 at 67).
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at 122-25).

Wright pulled his one-ton GMC van over into the

outside (right) lane and pulled up alongside the Honda when his
wife asked him to back off from the gravel being thrown by the
Honda, which had broken their windshield (R. 3007 at 158-60, 116).
Wright then pulled slightly ahead of the Honda (R. 3007 at 109).
Wright's brother Brian, also a passenger in the van, estimated both
cars were then going 50-55 mph (R. 3007 at 142). Brian looked over
at the Honda and saw McCorvey speed up and pass the van at 60-65
mph,

which

he

considered

an

unsafe

speed

for

conditions.

McCorvey's passenger, Page, was saying something, but the window
was closed (R. 3007 at 143, 154).7

Page flipped the, bird at the

van occupants as the Honda accelerated past (R. 3007 at 76, 143).
As McCorvey sped ahead of him, Paul Wayne Wright saw the Honda
pull up next to and slightly behind a semi, then fishtail three or
four times, prompting Wright to take his foot off the gas pedal (R.
3007 at 162-63).

He then watched the Honda go off into the median

and then veer back toward the highway and roll (R. 3007 at 163-65).
Wright's sister-in-law also saw McCorvey move left into thick
gravel on the left lane shoulder before losing control (R. 3007 at
95).

She estimated the semi was four to five van lengths ahead of

them and that the Honda had passed them, going 10-15 mph faster
than

the

van,

and

pulled

ahead

several

car

lengths

before

fishtailing in the thick rocks at the left edge of the roadway,

7

At her pretrial deposition, Wright's wife said she thought
that Page was shouting at them and that he looked angry, which
puzzled her since the gravel being thrown up by the Honda had just
broken their van's windshield (R. 3007 at 118).
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outside the lane of travel (R. 3007 at 77-78; 87-88). According to
Wright and his sister-in-law, he had no trouble controlling his van
and saw no reason for fishtailing on the flat stretch of road (R.
3007 at 166, 80). He could hear gravel flipping up as he drove and
had driven through chip seal projects before (R. 3007 at 167, 171).
A different picture of the sequence of events before the Honda
left the highway was painted by McCorvey, an experienced driver who
was well acquainted with this stretch of 1-15 and who had travelled
through chip seal operations in a variety of states and other
countries (R. 3003 at 25, 27, 81-82, 86). He felt the resurfacing
construction zone ended at the rest area at the top of the hill
near milemarker 136 (R. 3003 at 16, 65, 70), approximately one mile
after a radar detector in his car flipped off (R. 3003 at 87). He
recalled no "LOOSE GRAVEL" signs or any other warning signs past
that point, only 55 mph speed signs (R. 3003 at 16, 89, 94-94). As
he drove down the hill from the rest area, the chips got sparser
and the road "was in fine shape," although the lack of painted lane
striping indicated that it was newly resurfaced (R. 3003 at 17, 66,
He stayed in the left lane all the way down the hill,8 and

88).

he saw Wright was quite a ways behind him (R. 3003 at 17-18, 91).
Just as he passed the Cove Fort interchange (at milemarker
8

At his pretrial deposition, McCorvey had said he went down
the hill in the unswept outside (right) lane and was bombarded with
rocks there from the van ahead. The noise from the gravel woke up
Page. McCorvey asked Page what he would do in the situation and
Page recommended that he move into the left lane, which McCorvey
did about a fifth of a mile before the accident. He chose to
maintain his speed and remain in the left lane next to the van so
the thrown gravel would only hit the right side of his car. R.
3003 at 109-110.
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135), McCorvey claimed, the gravel got thick again and he had
difficulty controlling his car in the clumps of gravel (R. 3003 at
19, 70, 71, 75).

He decided not to move into the right lane

because he saw the gravel there was "very thick" (R. 3003 at 72).
The loose gravel being pulled up was loud in his wheel wells, and
he downshifted to only 41-45 mph (R. 3003 at 71, 76).

By then,

Wright was behind him about a hundred yards (R. 3003 at 19).
McCorvey sped up to tell Wright not to pass, then tried to occupy
both lanes to block Wright (R. 3003 at 97-99). Next, McCorvey said
he slowed down, giving Wright "a taste of the rocks" (R. 3003 at
98-99).

Wright then "gunned it" and tried to pass on the right,

showering McCorvey's car with gravel (R. 3003 at 20).

The loud

noise woke up his passenger, Page, who "communicated" with the
occupants of the van alongside them, although McCorvey could not
remember if that "communication" was Page giving the finger (R.
3003 at 21, 24, 30).
According to McCorvey, he was fishtailing and fighting to
control his car for nearly a mile of bad road before losing control
completely: "The car's doing what it wants.
shaking.
straight.

It's shimmying and

I'm having to, like, steer one way to make the car go
And then I'd get another, I hit another pocket of

gravel—It felt slick in the pockets of gravel." (R. 3003 at 22,
70, 100, 103, 106, 107). In the meantime, Wright's van threw up
gravel that McCorvey thought broke the Honda's windshield (R. 3003
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at 23, 105).9

Travelling in the low 50fs with Wright beside him,

McCorvey said he saw the one-ton van start to go out of control and
he claimed he was afraid Wright would kill them all by passsing on
the right (R. 3003 at 100).

McCorvey fishtailed three or four

times, then decided to give up and not try to keep up with Wright:
M

I'm not having a chariot race. It's like there's no other way, he

can have the road.

I'm not going to go those speeds, so I gave

(R. 3003 at 23, 78, 100).10

up."

At that point, he claimed, he

downshifted, accelerated, got caught in a clump of gravel over at
the edge of the road, and fishtailed out of control (R. 3003 at 2123, 100, 102). u

He estimated it was only a couple of seconds

between Page's "communication" with the Wright van occupants and
the time he left the road (R. 3003 at 31).
Highway Patrolman Max Shields had been through the entire
eleven miles of project site just ahead of McCorvey and Wright,
driving past the "NO PASSING" and "DO NOT PASS" signs, seeing
nothing unusual about this chip seal job, and observing no problems
with the traffic flow (R. 3006 at 118-121, 130). He parked his car
and then stopped a motorist at milemarker 133 for disobeying the
9

At his pretrial deposition, McCorvey said it was his bug
screen or gravel guard, not his windshield, that had been broken by
flying gravel (Transcript of November 20, 1990 at 80; R. 3003 at
109).
10

No mention was made by McCorvey of the semi that Wright and
his brother testified was just ahead and to the right of McCorvey
when he left the road.
n

Later, in the ambulance, an emergency medical technician
asked Page, injured but coherent, what happened. Page responded,
"We were going too fast. We came upon traffic, tried to pass on
the left, and lost control." (R. 3006 at 107). See note 8, supra.
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"DO NOT PASS" signs throughout the project.

While issuing a

warning citation, he saw the cloud of dust created when McCorvey
lost control of his car and entered the median (R. 3006 at 120-22).
Shields went immediately to the accident scene, but saw nothing in
the depth of the gravel chips on the roadway to indicate why
McCorvey had lost control and left the highway at Point A in photo
Exhibit 3k (R. 3006 at 140, 177-79).

However, Exhibits 3z, 3kx,

31x and 4c (in Addendum Item J), photographs taken within hours of
the accident, show a ridge of excess gravel along the left shoulder
of the inside (left) lane where McCorvey veered off into the median
(R. 2998 at 86-87).ll
Referring

to the photographs

in Exhibit

61, Plaintiff's

accident reconstructionist, Ernest Klein, pointed out a 1-1 1/2"
ridge of gravel on the shoulder of the inside (left) lane at Point
A.

In his opinion, these mounds of gravel along the shoulder of

the inside lane, also shown in photo Exs. 31x and 3kx, caused an
induced steer—which looks from the rear like fishtailing—that
sent McCorvey off the highway at 52-62 mph (R. 3002 at 17, 19, 28,
30, 36-37, 41-42, 47). Klein also opined that another contributing
cause of this accident was LeGrand's signing of the project site at
the time.

The signs posted did not, Klein said, adequately warn

drivers of the loose gravel hazard; they did not clearly tell
McCorvey and the other drivers what lane they should be in and what
12

Point A is also in the area of a construction joint in the
inside (left) lane. A construction joint is a spot where the
laying and spreading of gravel chips is stopped and then later
resumed, leaving a double layer of gravel that must be removed (R.
2998 at 90-92).
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speed they should be going as they travelled south from milemarker
136 to 134 (R. 3002 at 33, 36, 49, 51).
Klein conceded McCorvey could have slowed down his speed of up
to 65 mph when he encountered the "mounds" of gravel

(R. 3002 at

55, 61). McCorvey also had the room to slow down once into the
median, but there was no evidence that he braked (R. 3002 at 63,
68).

Instead, McCorvey caused his car to rollover when he turned

it sharply back toward the highway (R. 3002 at 67).
LeGrand's project supervisor, Steven Peterson, arrived at the
accident site soon after it happened. After a short time, he left
and drove north to the beginning of the project to check the
signing (R. 2998 at 49-52).

He drove slowly south through the

project, making notes on scratch paper of the location of the
warning signs and construction workers at the time of the accident.
The next day, Peterson drew up two signing diagrams from the notes
(R. 2998 at 53-54; Exs. 35 and 36, Addendum Items H and I).
According to Peterson's diagrams, McCorvey and Wright had passed:
"DO NOT PASS NEXT 15 MILES" signs at about milemarker 144.4; "ROAD
CONSTRUCTION AHEAD" signs 500' feet later; "DO NOT PASS" signs at
milemarker 144 and at every mile to milemarker 137; "RIGHT LANE
CLOSED" signs at the entrance to the rest area; "LOOSE GRAVEL"
signs 500' later; flagman symbol signs at the exit from the rest
area; another pair of "DO NOT PASS" signs at milemarker 136; an
early warner in the right lane moving traffic to the left lane just
before the Cove Fort interchange exit at milemarker 135; a flagman
at the exit ramp, where the chipping crew was working at the time
18

of McCorvey's accident; and another early warner just before the
Cove Fort interchange on ramp at approximately milemarker 134.6.
According to traffic control planner Holtan, all of the signing on
this project would have been visible to drivers on the straight
section of highway (R. 2998 at 203).
The memories of various witnesses at the November 1990 trial
conflicted with Peterson's account of what warning signs were
actually in place at the time of McCorvey's accident more than four
years earlier.

C. Dewey Taylor, for example, claimed there was

only one sign warning of the construction and it was located before
the rest area at the top of the hill, which is at milemarker 136.5.
He remembered no early warner with a flashing arrow at the Cove
Fort interchange off ramp or under the Cove Fort overpass and no
flagmen or flagmen symbol signs (R. 3009 at 102-03, 108, 117),
although he did remember a 25 mph speed limit sign (R. 3009 at
118).

Taylor remembered going by only two "DO NOT PASS" signs on

the right side of the road between the start of the project at
milemarker 144 and the accident site (R. 3009 at 116).
Villareal said there was no second early warner parked under
the Cove Fort overpass and that there was only one warning sign, at
the start of the construction zone, no signs by the rest area, and
no "NO PASSING" signs in the construction zone (R. 3004 at 15, 22,
28, 30. 44).

Although he remembered a "ROAD CONSTRUCTION" and

flagman sign at the rest area, Wright could not recall any early
warners, "LOOSE GRAVEL" signs, or "RIGHT LANE CLOSED" signs (R.
3007 at 157-58). McCorvey recalled no flagmen, "RIGHT LANE CLOSED"
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or "LOOSE GRAVEL" signs north or south of the rest area, and no
early warners anywhere (R. 3003 at 89-90, 94-95).

On the other

hand, Wright's sister-in-law and wife both saw the 25 mph advisory
speed limit sign at the top of the hill, at about milemarker 136.3,
and the latter remembered "DO NOT PASS" signs (R. 3007 at 91-92;
107, 127). Wright's wife, the front seat passenger, also testified
at her deposition that there could have been an early warner sign
with flashing lights because something was funneling cars into the
left lane, but she could not be sure (R. 3007 at 131-33).

In

addition, although LeGrand employee David Merchant testified at
trial that on August 7, 1986, he had set up the "RIGHT, LANE CLOSED"
signs required by the traffic control plan, his testimony was
impeached with his prior inconsistent deposition statement that he
had not posted such signs that day, but had set them up and leaned
them over on the side of the road where they could not be seen (R.
3006 at 67-68, 75). Throughout trial, plaintiff suggested that the
two early warners and

"ROADWORK AHEAD" signs required by the

traffic control plan when there was actual chip spreading going on
in a highway lane, as well as some of the "DO NOT PASS" signs, were
not actually in place at the time of the accident, but that
Peterson or other LeGrand personnel had moved them into position in
time to be photographed in Exs. 3 and 4 (Addendum Item J) within
hours after the accident (e.g., R. 2998 at 216-217; R. 3008 at 10810).
This
engineer,

factual
Edward

dispute

aside,

Ruzak, stated
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plaintiff's

that even if

expert
the

traffic

signing in

Peterson's diagrams was in place at the time of the accident, it
was inadequate for guiding drivers through the project site and
that this inadequacy caused McCorvey's accident (R. 2999 at 43-44).
The main deficiency was that, even though there were "DO NOT PASS"
signs, LeGrand did nothing to close down the unswept outside
(right) lane by making it physically impossible for Wright to enter
it and try to pass McCorvey while throwing up loose chips at his
car (R. 2999 at 50-52).
In the opinion of defendants' traffic control and chip seal
expert, Richard Leuttich, the traffic control plan itself had
nothing to do with this accident.

The plan was meant to control

and move traffic, more than 2,000 vehicles per day here, through
the portion of the project in which there was active chip spreading
work going on. McCorvey had safely passed beyond that point, which
was at the Cove Fort interchange ramps.

Thus, even if the

project's signing plan was flawed, it was not a cause of this
accident (R. 3006 at 227-30, 234), a view echoed by UDOT's traffic
control plan designer (R. 2998 at 205). Leuttich concluded there
was no reason why traffic could not use both lanes of southbound I15 past the interchange, noting it is a reasonable and common
industry practice to allow traffic back on to a newly rolled but
unswept section of freshly chipped roadway (R. 3006 at 229, 236,
238, 260). Although he agreed that state and federal regulations
suggest traffic be controlled once allowed to travel an unswept but
rolled

lane, in Leuttich's

judgment that control is normally

provided by the road conditions themselves, particularly by the
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amount of noise made by the gravel on a vehicle, because prudent
-drivers respond by slowing down to reasonable speeds (R. 3006 at
238, 252-53, 255). The advisory speed limit signs were posted as
a warning to reduce the throwing of chips

(R. 3006 at 231).

Furthermore, if you leave two lanes open, a driver will take the
most advantageous lane; thus, if one is full of unswept chips, the
average driver will take the one that is not (R. 3006 at 236).
Leuttich

rejected

as

unnecessary

and

dangerous

the

recommendation of plaintiff's experts that up to five miles of the
outside, unswept southbound lane should have been closed off with
orange traffic cones or another channelizing device until swept (R.
3006 at 230-31).

He also rejected McCorvey's claim that he was

hopelessly "trapped" in the inside lane, since McCorvey could have
escaped any gravel being thrown at his car from the unswept outside
lane by simply slowing down and dropping back (R. 3006 at 232).
Defendants' other chip seal expert, Robert Galloway, saw no
evidence in the photo exhibits of windshield breakage or other
gravel damage on the Honda in the photos taken at the accident
scene (Transcript of November 20, 1990 at 21). He also saw nothing
in the amount of gravel shown in the photo series taken shortly
after the accident (Exs. P3 and P4, Addendum Item J) to explain
McCorvey's loss of control since he had three times as much
friction as he needed to successfully complete a passing maneuver
in the inside (left) southbound lane (Transcript of November 20,
1990 at 31-33). Darkened wheel paths, called "tracking," in photos
Exs. 3f, 3g, 3h, 3i and 3k show that vehicles using the inside lane
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were making contact with the rock. Photo Ex. 3m shows oil staining
of the grassy tracks of McCorvey's car as it veered off the
roadway, indicating that his tires had been touching the road
(Transcript of November 20# 1990 at 38). Furthermore, the slope on
the shoulder down into the median could be safely driven, if
needed, by someone using sound judgment who was not going too fast
(Transcript of November 20, 1990 at 27-28).
Galloway thought an advisory 25 mph limit was a judicious
speed limit on the unswept chipped and rolled interstate lane for
the first 24 hours in order to reduce rock turnover and damage to
windshields and car paint.

It would have been desirable, in his

view, to have placed advisory 25 mph speed limit signs every 5001,000' for speed control, but this would be more than what was
called for by the recommendations in the Manual on Uniform Traffic
Control Devices (Transcript of November 20, 1990 at 54-55, 57).
In the opinion of defendants' accident

reconstructionist,

Newell Knight, this rollover accident was caused solely by driver
error; McCorvey was inattentive to the apparent conditions in the
road's driving path (Transcript of November 20, 1990 at 66, 109).
He found was no objective evidence of anything on the inside lane
of traffic

that caused McCorvey to lose control of his car

(Transcript of November 20, 1990 at 74). There was no excess of
gravel from the chipping two days before, and what had been put
down had imbedded into the emulsion (Transcript of November 20,
1990 at 72). There was no excess gravel in the lane at the point
where McCorvey left it that would have caused any difficulty in
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steering (Transcript of November 20, 1990 at 95). There were no
marks left in the inside lane, as would be expected if McCorvey had
lost control there in thick gravel; there was only a gradual runoff
mark of McCorvey's car as it ran off the road edge and entered the
median, indicating

no abrupt movement

on the roadway itself

(Transcript of November 20, 1990 at 72-73, 75).
Photo Exs. 3e, 3k, 4b and 4f show the texture of the roadway,
the amount of gravel in the roadway, and the obvious dark wear
pattern of traffic in the newly resurfaced inside (left) lane all
the way down the hill from the rest area, past the Cove Fort
overpass and down past the accident site (Transcript of November
20, 1990 at 68-69, 75-76).

See photos in Addendum Item J.

The

dark tracks of normal traffic in the inside (left) lane, shown in
numerous photos taken shortly after the accident, indicate that the
chips there had already embedded in the emulsion (Transcript of
November 20, 1990 at 67-68, 69). Photo Ex. 3o shows the depth of
the gravel against the 2" high tabs and at the edge of the road, as
well as the wear pattern of traffic through the compressed gravel
chips in the inside (Transcript of November 20, 1990 at 69-70). In
photo Ex. 3r, one can see a wide crayon mark drawn by the
investigating officers on the compacted gravel at the very edge of
the inside (left) lane (Transcript of November 20, 1990 at 70).
According to Knight, McCorvey had neither driven reasonably
nor reacted reasonably to the conditions he said he encountered in
the

left

lane

(Transcript

of

November

20,

1990

at

80-83).

McCorvey's car was purportedly being hit and damaged by loose
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gravel, he was angry, and he was having trouble controlling his car
once past the Cove Fort interchange at milemarker 135? nonetheless,
McCorvey never slowed down (Transcript of November 20, 1990 at 82).
A

reasonable

driver

under

these

circumstances

would

have

decelerated and dropped back to avoid any gravel being thrown by
other cars; instead, McCorvey responded by trying to go even faster
to pass, moved outside the travel path in the left lane, and lost
control in gravel on the inside highway shoulder (Transcript of
November 20, 1990 at 82).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
McCorvey's passenger, Page, filed suit first (No. C87-3404),
in June 1987, claiming his injuries were the result of negligence
by McCorvey, the State, and various John Does (R. 002, 004). Page
and McCorvey reached a settlement in October 1987 and the latter
was dismissed out as a defendant in Page's suit (R. 081; 0101).
In December 1987, UDOT filed a third-party complaint against
McCorvey alleging that his negligent driving was the proximate
cause of Page's injuries

(R. 0114-15).

Three months later,

McCorvey filed a separate lawsuit (No. C88-1818) against UDOT and
LeGrand.

In his sole cause of action against UDOT, McCorvey

alleged that UDOT and/or LeGrand had negligently caused a dangerous
condition to exist on the highway (Separate Record in C88-1818 at
002-05, Addendum Item K). 13

In answer, UDOT denied negligence and

13

McCorvey's pleaded claims against LeGrand were based on its
allegedly negligent performance of the actual resurfacing and the
implementation of traffic control at the project, as well as the
allegedly deficient traffic control plan itself.
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asserted that McCorvey's injuries were solely caused by his own
negligence or that of other defendants.

Alternatively, UDOT

asserted that his negligence was greater than that of any by UDOT
(Separate Record in C88-1818 at 020-23).
The two lawsuits were consolidated (R. 0153), u and Paul Wayne
Wright was brought in as a defendant in September 1988 (R. 0179).
He was, however, dismissed out as a party defendant by McCorvey and
Wright three months before trial, although his proportionate fault
was still to be determined at trial (R. 1827).
Trial commenced on November 7, 1990. Defendants' motions for
a directed verdict (R. 3007 at 103; R. 3008 at 37, 118-128) were
denied (R. 3008 at 135).
retired

to

begin

The jurors were instructed and they

deliberations

at

1:00

pm

the

day

before

Thanksgiving, November 21, 1990 (R. 3008 at 112). They returned
with a special verdict at 6:30 pm (R. 3008 at 134), in which they
found that each of the following persons or entities was negligent
as claimed, that their negligence was the proximate cause of
plaintiff's injuries, and that their relative proportions of fault
were as follows:
LeGrand Johnson Construction Co.
State of Utah
Daniel McCorvey
Wayne Wright

50%
28%
10%
12%

(R. 02521-23). The jury found McCorvey's damages to be $5,421,282
(R. 02523).

After denial of defendants' motions for new trial (R.

u

Page's claims against all defendants were eventually
dismissed in a post-trial order based on the parties' stipulations
R. 2599).
26

2683-2704, 2732-33, 2903, 2916), judgment was entered against
LeGrand for $2,710,641 and against UDOT for $250,000 (R. 265963).15
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
In light of the jury's other special findings, reasonable
minds could not have concluded from the evidence presented that
negligent omissions from UDOT's traffic control plan were the
proximate cause of harm to McCorvey.

UDOT's negligence could not

be a substantial factor in bringing about that harm because of the
overwhelmingly predominant effects of the subsequent negligent
conduct by McCorvey, Wright, and LeGrand. Even if it were such, as
a matter of law either LeGrand's subsequent intervening conduct or
the

subsequent

intervening

conduct

of

McCorvey

and

Wright,

intervening forces which were legally unforeseeable, constituted a
superseding proximate cause of the harm to McCorvey.
If the evidence is viewed in a light favorable to the jury's
special verdict finding McCorvey negligent, no jury acting fairly
and reasonably could have also found that UDOT's failure to adopt
a traffic control plan physically preventing this side-by-side road
race through a part of the chip seal resurfacing project was more
blameworthy than McCorvey's own voluntary engagement in one with
Wright despite the known danger and the obvious risks involved.
It was

prejudicial

error

to

give

a

sudden

peril

jury

instruction because that doctrine was implicitly extinguished by

15

The State's proportionate liability of $1,517,800 was reduced
to $250,000 pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34(1) (1989).
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the legislature's abandonment of the contributory negligence system
that engendered the doctrine in the first place.

An actor's

conduct in light of any sudden peril faced should be evaluated for
its reasonableness and its culpability in accordance with standard
comparative fault principles.

In any event, the trial court

prejudicially erred in giving Instruction 33 because the evidence
compels the conclusion that any sudden peril faced by McCorvey was
the product of his own negligent conduct.
ARGUMENTS
!•

THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF
LAW TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT ANY NEGLIGENT
DEFICIENCIES IN UDOT'S TRAFFIC CONTROL PLAN
WERE THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF McCORVEY'S INJURY.

Negligence
established

by

is

conduct

which

falls

law for the protection

below

the

of others

standard

against an

unreasonable risk of injury:
It necessarily involves a foreseeable risk, a threatened
danger of injury, and conduct unreasonable in proportion
to the danger. If one could not reasonably foresee any
injury as the result of one's act, or if one's conduct
was reasonable in light of what one could anticipate,
there would be no negligence, and no liability.
Prosser & Keeton on The Law of Torts § 43, at 280 (5th ed. 1984)
(footnote omitted) [hereinafter "Prosser"1. McCorvey's theory of
UDOT's negligence and liability was based on alleged deficiencies
in the traffic control plan on the Cove Fort Project (R. 3008 at
63; R. 01024).

First, the warning signs and devices in the plan

did not adequately warn drivers of the hazard presented by the
loose resurfacing material in southbound 1-15. Second, the traffic
control plan should have either (a) physically closed off the
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outside (right) lane to traffic from milemarker 136 to 134 until it
was swept (R. 3008 at 48, 63),16 or (b) imposed traffic speeds in
the open, unswept outside lane slower than the posted 55 mph
regulatory limit (R. 01024-30). UDOT's theory of the case was that
McCorvey

and Wright were the proximate

causes

of McCorvey's

injuries because they had negligently failed to:

observe and

respond to the apparent, existing road conditions; reduce speeds
accordingly; keep safe distances from other cars; adhere to posted
speed limit and "DO NOT PASS" signs; and change lanes properly, all
with due regard for their own safety and that of other drivers (R.
02560-61).
To succeed on his negligence claim against UDOT, McCorvey
was required to establish that:

UDOT owed McCorvey a duty of

reasonable care not to approve a traffic control plan that exposed
him to an unreasonable risk of harm; UDOT breached that duty by
approving a traffic control plan with one of the omissions noted
above (negligence); the breach of duty was the proximate cause of
McCorveyfs injuries; and there was, in fact, injury.

Reeves, 813

P.2d at 116; Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985).
Proximate cause is ordinarily a matter to be determined by the
jury, Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240, 245 (Utah 1985);
Godeskv v. Provo Citv Corp., 690 P.2d

541, 544

(Utah 1984);

Thompson v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., 688 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah

16

As evidence of this deficiency in the plan, McCorvey
contended that it did not conform with the recommended methods for
signing and lane closure set out in the Manual on Uniform Traffic
Devices (Ex. 38).
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1984).

However, the absence of proximate cause can be determined

as a matter of law if evidence of causation is lacking or if
reasonable minds could not differ on the evidence presented as to
what was or was not the proximate cause of the injury.

Mitchell,

697 P.2d at 245; Jensen v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 611
P.2d 363, 365 n.4 (Utah 1980); Restatement (Second) of Torts §
434(1) (1965); £ee. Steffensen v. Smith's Mcrctt. Corp., 172 Utah
Adv. Rep. 36, 38 (Utah App. 1991).
"Proximate cause" is routinely defined by Utah appellate
courts as
that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,
(unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces
the injury and without which the result would not have
occurred.
It is the efficient cause—the one that
necessarily sets in operation the factors that accomplish
the injury.
Steffensen, 172 Utah Adv. Rep. at 38 (quoting State v. Lawson, 688
P.2d 479, 482 & n.3 (Utah 1984)); accord Mitchell, 697 P.2d at 24546; Watters v. Ouerrv, 626 P.2d 455, 455
definition

highlights

the

cause-in-fact

(Utah 1981).
aspect

of

This

proximate

causation. But the term "proximate cause" also has a public policy
aspect, often referred to as "legal cause" by many courts and
commentators,17 which limits the potentially boundless liability
of an actor whose conduct is a "cause" of plaintiff's injury in the
but/for sense:
Once it has been established that the defendant's
conduct has in fact been one of the causes of the
17

E.g., Prosser §§ 41-42 (and cases cited therein); Thode,
"Duty-Risk v. Proximate Cause and the Rational Allocation of
Functions between Judge and Jury," 1977 Utah L. Rev. 1, 15.
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plaintiff's injury, there remains the question whether
the defendant should be legally responsible for the
injury. Unlike the fact of causation, with which it is
often hopelessly confused, this is primarily a problem of
law.
It is sometimes said to depend on whether the
conduct has been so significant and important a cause
that the defendant should be legally responsible. But
both significance and importance turn upon conclusions in
terms of legal policy, so that they depend essentially on
whether the policy of the law will extend the
responsibility for the conduct to the consequences which
have in fact occurred.
Prosser § 42, at 272-73 (footnotes omitted); see id. § 43, at 281;
Thode, supra note 16, at 8.

In Utah, appellate courts have

addressed these policy limitations on the scope of an actor's
liability

under

the

rubric

of

"proximate

cause,"

alternative theories of analysis are possible. See, 4.Q..

although
Prosser

§ 4 3 and cited cases. As this Court has stated,
Proximate cause is a legal construct calling for a legal
conclusion based on various factors in addition to an
actual cause-effect relationship. It is common place in
the law that an act, omission, or force may be an actual
cause, but not a proximate cause.
Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah
1985).18
There are two distinct bases for concluding that the evidence
is insufficient to support a finding that any omission in UDOT's
traffic control plan was the legal cause of the injury McCorvey
incurred when he lost control of his car in thick gravel and ran
off the highway.

Stated another way, there are two reasons why no

18

In closing argument, McCorvey's counsel twice erroneously
informed the jurors that a "proximate cause," defined for them in
Instruction 35 (R. 02565), is simply any cause that meets a but/for
test, i.e., ••[B]ut for that failure to control traffic" and "[B]ut
for that conduct [of defendants] would there have been any
accident?" (R. 3008 at 62, 63).
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reasonable jury could conclude, on the evidence presented, that
UDOT's negligence was a proximate cause of McCorvey's injury, even
if it was a cause-in-fact in the but/for sense.
A.

UDOT's negligence could not be the legal cause
of the harm to McCorvey: omissions from the
traffic control plan were not a substantial
causative
factor
in
light
of
the
overwhelmingly predominant effects of the
other, subsequent
contributing
causative
actions of McCorvey, Wright, and LeGrand.

The proximate cause element of a negligence claim requires the
plaintiff to show both that defendant's conduct is a cause-in-fact
of the plaintiff's injury and that defendant's conduct was a
"substantial causative factor" leading to plaintiff's injury.
Mitchell, 697 P.2d at 246 & n.19; Williams, 699 P.2d at 726
(plaintiff's burden to show it was a "proximate" cause, as well as
"actual" cause); see also Bennion, 701 P.2d at 1083; Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 431, comment a (1965) (not enough that the harm
would not have occurred if the actor had not been negligent);
Carlotta v. Warner, 601 F. Supp. 749, 752-53 (E.D. Ky. 1985) (even
in

comparative

negligence

jurisdiction,

plaintiff

must

show

defendant's negligent act or omission was a substantial factor in
causing plaintiff's harm); Sharp v. North Star Borough, 569 P.2d
178, 181 (Alaska 1977) (negligent conduct may be proximate cause of
injury only if, more likely than not, it was a substantial factor
in bringing it about).19
19

See also Utah State Bar Litigation Section, Model Utah Jury
Instructions § 3.12 (Draft April 15, 1991):
In addition to deciding whether the defendant was
negligent, you must decide if that negligence was a
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The

Restatement's

"substantial

factor"

formulation

of

proximate, or legal, causation as a limit on legal responsibility
was embraced by this court in Cox v. Thompson, 123 Utah 81, 254
P.2d 1047, 1051 (1952); accord Hall v. Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164,
417 P.2d 664, 667 (1966).

See also Mitchell, 697 P.2d at 246;

Badger v. Clavson, 18 Utah 2d 329, 4222 P.2d 665, 666 (1967)
(approving an instruction that a driver's unreasonable failure to
keep a lookout would incur liability if it "proximately contributed
in any substantial degree to cause the collision[.]"); Devine v.
Cook, 3 Utah 2d 134, 279 P.2d 1073, 1080 (1955)-

It is currently

set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431 (1965), which
provides:

"The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm

to another if (a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing
about the harm . . . ."

Here, the word "substantial"

is used to denote the fact that defendant's conduct has
such an effect in producing the harm as to lead
reasonable men to regard it as a cause, using that word
in the popular sense, in which there always lurks the
idea of responsibility, rather than in the so-called
"philosophic sense," which includes every one of the
great number of events without which any happening would
not have occurred. Each of these events is a cause in
the so-called "philosophic" sense, yet the effect of many
of them is so insignificant that no ordinary mind would
think of them as causes.

"proximate cause" of the plaintiff's injuries.
To find "proximate cause," you must first find a
cause and effect relationship between the negligence and
plaintiff's injury. But cause and effect alone is not
enough.
For injuries to be proximately caused by
negligence, two factors must be present:
First, the negligence must have played a substantial
role in causing the injuries; and
Second, a reasonable person could foresee that the
injury could result from the negligent behavior.
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.Id., comment

a.

The considerations

combination,

important

in

determining

that are, alone and in
whether

a

defendant's

negligence constitutes a substantial factor are
(a) the number of other factors which contribute in
producing the harm and the extent of the effect which
they have in producing it;
(b) whether the actor's conduct has created a force or
series of forces which are in continuous and active
operation up to the time of the harm, or has created a
situation harmless unless acted upon by other forces for
which the actor is not responsible;
(c) lapse of time.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433 (1965).
In Carlotta, 601 F. Supp. at 752-54, the court applied the
substantial factor test in a case involving a plaintiff tenant
injured diving onto an inner tube he had put into an apartment
complex swimming pool in violation of the defendant complex owner's
regulations. The court concluded as a matter of law that, even if
the

defendant

was

negligent

in

failing

to

enforce

those

regulations—an omission that would undeniably be a cause-in-fact
of the accident—plaintiff's active negligence in encountering and
creating the very risk that caused his injury prevented the
defendant's slight and passive negligence from being a substantial
factor in bringing about the accident.

Notwithstanding the fact

that Kentucky is a comparative negligence state, defendant was
granted summary judgment because plaintiff was held to be the sole
proximate cause of his own injuries. See

District of Columbia v.

Freeman, 477 A.2d 713, 716-17 (D.C. App. 1984) (no jury could
reasonably conclude that a municipality's negligent failure to
erect

a downed

sign warning

of a crosswalk
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200' ahead was

substantial cause of injuries incurred by pedestrian in crosswalk
of which defendant driver was actually aware); Munson v, State
Dep't of Highways, 531 P.2d 1174 (Idaho 1975) (applying substantial
factor test and holding that repair crew's failure to erect signs
warning of blocked construction zone could not reasonably be found
a legal cause of fatal injuries incurred when driver observed
clearly visible repair crew and equipment ahead in lane but
nonetheless rearended pickup stopped by crew's flagger); see also
Reidling v. Wickes Lumber & Building Supply Co., 471 S.W.2d 319,
321 (Ky. 1971) (downed stop sign not proximate cause of crash
because driver had statutory duty to stop even in absence of sign);
Atkinson v. County of Oneida, 59 N.Y.2d 840, 464 N.Y.S.2d 747, 451
N.E.2d 494, 495 (1983) (failure to install additional warning
lights and advisory speed sign not proximate cause of crash because
drivers familiar with intersection).
In this case, UDOT was found negligent because its traffic
control plan for this resurfacing project did not require the
contractor

either

to use more warning

signs

or to make it

physically impossible for two drivers moving too fast for the loose
gravel conditions to be abreast of each other in the two southbound
lanes from milemarker 136 to 134. The plan did, however, require
numerous signs warning of the loose gravel and resurfacing activity
in the area, regulatory

"DO NOT PASS" signs every mile, and

advisory 25 mph speed limits signs (Ex. 10, Addendum Item B ) .
Onto this stage set move three other negligent actors. At the
time plaintiff reached the project site, there is some evidence
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that LeGrand failed to implement fully UDOT's approved traffic
control plan.

Nonetheless, McCorvey and Wright drove over eight

miles of newly resurfaced highway—past the numerous warning signs
that were in place—before reaching the rolled but unswept section
of the outside lane at about milemarker 136 (see photos of entire
project site included as Item J in separate Addendum).

They were

indisputably aware, even before that point, that they were each in
a loose gravel resurfacing project, a highway condition that
required them to slow down even in the absence of regulatory speed
limit or warning signs requiring them to do so.

Utah Code Ann. §

41-6-46 (1970) (driver's duty to drive at speed reasonable in light
of existing hazards on road, actual and potential).

Instead,

Wright travels south toward milemarker 136 at speeds up to 75 mph,
illegally passing Taylor on the left shoulder and then Villareal on
the right. Both Wright and McCorvey went downhill from milemarker
136 for over a mile at speeds too fast for obviously impaired
conditions and at or in excess of the 55 mph regulatory speed limit
signs, past a flagger, resurfacing equipment and a crew at the Cove
Fort overpass at milemarker 135, and then tried to illegally pass
each other in a dangerous, macho game of chicken.

In a foolish

attempt to beat out Wright, even though he was aware of the loose
gravel in both lanes and was driving a small lightweight sports
car, McCorvey accelerated even more, to 60-65 mph, instead of
merely taking his foot off the gas to slow down and drop back and

36

away from Wright.20
At this point, these three active forces encounter another set
in motion by the contractor, which left mounds of thick loose
gravel in the swept, outside left lane.

At the very moment

McCorvey accelerates to win their race, his small car gets caught
in some deep excess gravel left by the contractor in the left lane
that sends him out of control and off the highway.

Once in the

median, instead of slowing down, McCorvey again foolishly tries to
get back onto the roadway by steering hard to the right, sending
the Honda into a disastrous roll that ejects him and his passenger.
These

five factors

other than the traffic

control plan

immediately and substantially contributed to the harm suffered by
McCorvey: LeGrand's failure to have in place all the signs required
by the traffic control plan; McCorveyfs

speeding and illegal

passing in disregard of warnings in place and observed conditions
and failure to slow down when challenged by Wright; Wright's
speeding and illegal passing on the right side in a no passing zone
in disregard of posted warnings and observed conditions; LeGrand's
failure to remove clumps of loose gravel from the left lane; and
McCorvey's turn once in the median. The combined effects of these
contributing factors were so predominant in producing the harm to
McCorvey as to render the effect of UDOT's prior negligence in
adopting the traffic control plan minimal and insignificant in
comparison,

preventing

the

latter

20

from

being

a

substantial

If McCorvey had touched his brakes for only 7/10ths of a
second he could have separated himself 50' from another vehicle
(Transcript of November 20, 1990 at 83).
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causative factor.
comment d.

See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433(a),

No reasonable jury could conclude otherwise.

The same conclusion is compelled if one examines the situation
created by UDOT's traffic control plan, as directed by Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 433(b) (1965). That plan permitted traffic in
both southbound lanes at up to 55 mph, but required a "DO NOT PASS"
sign every mile throughout the project.

Observant, law-abiding

drivers travelling up to 55 mph from milemarker 136 to 134, keeping
a safe, lawful distance behind the car ahead and not passing
another car, could maneuver through the loose resurfacing material
in either lane without losing control of their cars. Two thousand
cars per day actually managed to do so on this resurfaced stretch
of 1-15.
There will always be some risk of harm whenever a highway is
resurfaced with the chip seal process. Even if the traffic control
plan omissions created a greater risk of harm by allowing cars onto
the outside, unswept lane at normal traffic speeds, the risk of
physical harm to drivers evading gravel thrown from that outside
(right) lane was still, at most, a remote potential risk.

The

actual risk created by UDOT's traffic control plan was one of harm
to windshields and paint jobs if drivers did not obey the numerous
"DO NOT PASS" signs and warning signs the plan did require and heed
apparent road conditions by slowing down. The situation created by
the traffic control plan was essentially harmless to McCorvey's
physical wellbeing unless and until acted upon by the other
causative forces that created an actual, likely risk of personal

38

injury.

See Restatement § 441(1), comment b.

There was some

evidence not all of the required warning signs were in place. Then
two illegally passing drivers who are, or should be, aware that
they are in a chip resealing zone nonetheless jockey to get ahead
of each other while kicking up loose gravel at illegal high speeds.
They set in motion

forces that then combined with the most

predominant force, i.e., thick gravel left upon the left lane by a
negligent contractor, and then with another causative force exerted
by McCorvey when he tried to return to the highway instead of
slowing down in the median.
Whether

the

predominant

effects

of

the

numerous

other

contributing factors are considered by themselves or together with
the harmlessness of the situation created by the traffic control
plan, no reasonable factfinder could conclude that defects in the
traffic control plan had anything but an insignificant effect in
producing harm to McCorvey. Because there is insufficient evidence
that UDOT's omissions were a substantial factor in bringing about
that harm, this Court should determine as a matter of law that
UDOT's negligence was not a proximate cause of plaintiff's injury
and accordingly reverse the judgment against UDOT.
B.

Even if omissions from the traffic control
plan were a substantial factorr the subsequent
negligent conduct of LeGrand alone or the
subsequent, concurring negligent conduct of
McCorvey and Wright, which were legally
unforeseeable, intervened and became the
superseding proximate cause of the harm# thus
relieving UDOT of legal responsibility.

Like the "substantial factor" test discussed above, the law of
superseding causation essentially involves a policy question of the
39

extent

of

the

defendant's

legal

responsibility

and

not

just

"causation," since the issue does not arise until cause-in-fact is
established.
An

actor

bringing

Prosser § 44, at 301; see Bennion, 701 P.2d at 1083.

whose
about

negligent
harm

conduct

is

is

a

nonetheless

substantial
relieved

factor

from

in

legal

responsibility by a superseding cause that is an intervening force,
whether

it

is

Restatement
important

the

(Second)
in

act
of

determining

of

a

Torts

third
§

440

whether

an

person

or

(1965).

another

force.

Considerations

intervening

force

is

a

superseding cause of harm are set forth in Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 442 (1965):
(a) the fact that its intervention brings about harm
different in kind from that which would otherwise have
resulted from the actor's negligence;
(b) the fact that its operation or the consequences
thereof appear after the event to be extraordinary rather
than normal in view of the circumstances existing at the
time of its operation;
(c) the fact that the intervening force is operating
independently of any situation created by the actor's
negligence, or, on the other hand, is or is not a normal
result of such a situation;
(d) the fact that the operation of the intervening
force is due to a third person's act or to his failure to
act;
(e) the fact that the intervening force is due to an
act of a third person which is wrongful toward the other
and as such subjects the third person to liability to
him;
(f) the degree of culpability of a wrongful act of
a third person which sets the intervening force in
motion.
If the subsequent intervening force is negligent conduct, it does
not constitute a superseding cause of the harm incurred if the
intervening negligence was foreseeable by the earlier actor at the
time of the earlier actor's conduct.
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Godeskv, 690 P.2d at 545;

Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217, 219 (Utah 1983);
Jensen v. Mountain States Tel & Tel, Co., 611 P.2d 363 (Utah 1980).
In Jensen,
Restatement

the

court

(Second)

adopted
of

this

Torts

§

foreseeability
447

(1965)

rule

from

[hereinafter

"Restatement"]:
The fact that an intervening act of a third person
is negligent in itself or is done in a negligent manner
does not make it a superseding cause of harm to another
which the actor's negligent conduct is a substantial
factor in bringing about, if
(a) the actor at the time of his negligence should
have realized that a third person might so act, or
(b) a reasonable man knowing the situation existing
when the act of the third person was done would not
regard it as highly extraordinary that the third person
had so acted, or
(c) the intervening act is a normal consequence of
a situation created by the actor's conduct and the manner
in
which
it
is
done
is
not
extraordinarily
negligent. [21]
Stated another way, foreseeable intervening causes of harm, even if
they are negligent conduct, are within the scope of the original
risk, and hence of the antecedent actor's negligence. Prosser § 44
at 303. Thus, "the standard of reasonable conduct may require the
defendant to protect the plaintiff against

'that occasional]

negligence which is one of the ordinary incidents of human life and
therefore to be anticipated.'"

Harris, 671 P.2d at 219 (quoting

Prosser, The Law of Torts § 44, at 274, now Prosser § 44, at 304).
There are two alternative grounds for concluding that UDOT's
legal responsibility in this case is cut off by a superseding
cause.

The first consists of the intervening act of the third

21

The rule in this section applies to intervening negligent
acts by the injured person or a third person. Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 447, comment h (1965).
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party, LeGrand, in failing to properly roll and sweep the inside
(left) lane to eliminate the mounds of loose gravel that eventually
sent McCorvey off the highway out of control.
This subsequent intervening force by a third person was the
most critical contributing cause in the sense that the presence of
thick patches of excess loose gravel at the edge of the inside lane
created a high likelihood of physical harm to drivers there—
particularly those in smallf lightweight cars—because it created
an actual risk that they would, even if travelling at speeds
reasonable in light of the loose gravel that was apparent in that
southbound lane for several miles, lose control of their vehicles.
See Restatement § 442(d).

McCorvey and Wright could have even

played their high-speed game and the Honda could have nonetheless
maneuvered to the end of the project site without leaving the
highway if McCorvey's last acceleration had not concurred precisely
in time and space with the patch of thick gravel LeGrand left in
the

roadway.

LeGrand's

active

conduct,

which

was

totally

independent from (not a consequence of) the passively harmless
situation created by omissions from the traffic control plan, thus
brought about physical harm drastically different in kind from the
harm that otherwise was reasonably likely to result from the
negligent omissions from the traffic control plan. See Restatement
§ 442(a), (c), 447(c); see also Restatement § 441(1), comment b.22
22

If this issue were analyzed in terms of duty/risk, UDOT would
argue that it should not be held liable because the harm that
occurred was not of the same general nature as that specifically
risked by its negligence. See Merhi v. Becker, 164 Conn. 516, 325
A.2d 270, 273 (1973); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 442B (1965).
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In light of the high probability of some serious physical harm
resulting from leaving thick loose gravel in a lane where heavy
traffic is moving at 55 mph, this conduct by LeGrand can only be
viewed as extreme negligence involving a relatively high degree of
culpability, just as the jury found.
447(c),

See Restatement §§ 442(f),

Looking back on this accident, this shocking omission by

LeGrand, an experienced chip seal resurfacing contractor, is so
extraordinary that UDOT could not reasonably have foreseen, when it
adopted the traffic control plan allowing traffic into the outside,
unswept lane at speeds up to 55 mph, that LeGrand would so act.
Given the evidence on these relevant considerations, no jury
acting reasonably and fairly could have concluded that LeGrand was
not the superseding cause of injury to McCorvey. This Court should
so hold and reverse the portion of the judgment against UDOT
accordingly.
Even if the court determines that LeGrand's conduct in leaving
thick

patches

of

excess

gravel

in

the

roadway

was, though

negligent, legally foreseeable to UDOT and thus not a superseding
cause, there is another ground for concluding that UDOT's legal
responsibility

to

superseding cause.

McCorvey

is

nonetheless

terminated

by

a

This second superseding cause consists of the

concurring, intervening conduct of McCorvey and Wright that the
jury found proximately caused McCorvey's injuries.

Under the duty/risk method of analysis, "[t]he issue for the court
is whether the risk to which the plaintiff has been subjected is
within the scope of defendant's duty." Thode, supra note 16 at 26.
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These

subsequently

concurring

proximate

causes

of

this

accident, which together form an intervening force as defined in
Restatement

§ 441, drastically

augmented

the actual

risk of

physical harm first created by LeGrand and actually brought about
harm different

in kind

from that which would have otherwise

resulted only from any antecedent negligent omissions from UDOT's
traffic control plan.

See Restatement §§ 442(a), 442B.

As

discussed above, UDOT's traffic control plan did not, standing
alone, create a legal injury.

See id. at § 442(c), comment d. At

most, it created a passive situation that was harmless until acted
upon by this new active, intervening force; the situation was only
a potentially dangerous one capable of being made injurious by
drivers not only going too fast in light of the obvious hazards,
but also disobeying posted speed limits and "DO NOT PASS" signs to
compete in a road race. See Restatement § 441(1), comment b. The
intervening

force—composed

of these actions by McCorvey and

Wright—was "independent" in the Restatement sense in that it was
not a normal result of the situation created by UDOT's passive
negligence.

See Merz v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 53 Wis.2d 47, 191

N.W.2d 876, 881 (1971) (intervening act of cab driver who backed
wrong way down one way street was superseding cause of injury to
person he collided with, because act was abnormal reaction to
street blockage by negligent defendant's truck). The engagement in
a road race through a known and obviously hazardous loose gravel
zone, at speeds in excess of the posted legal limit and in excess
of what apparent road conditions demanded, was not conceivably a
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"normal" response to the fact that both of these newly resurfaced
lanes were open, the regulatory speed limit was 55 mph, and the
recommended

speed limit was 25 mph.

The unreasonable (i.e.,

negligent) character of the acts by McCorvey and Wright only
buttresses the inescapable

conclusion that they comprised

an

"abnormal" intervening force in the sense contemplated by the
Restatement

rules

for determining

the

extent

of

an

actor's

liability.

See Restatement §§ 443, comment c, 447, comment c.23

Thus, any antecedent negligence by UDOT did not influence the
intervening force. See Restatement §§ 442(b)-(d), 443 and comment
a.
In hindsight, the operation of these subsequent causative
factors as an intervening force bringing about physical harm can
only be deemed extraordinary in light of the circumstances existing
at the time of intervention.

See id. at § 442(b), 443, comment b;

see also Stratioti v. Bick, 704 F.2d 1052, 1054 (8th Cir. 1983)
(defendant's negligence not legal cause of injury if appellate
court, looking back from harm to negligent conduct, concludes it is
highly extraordinary that it should have brought about the harm
because the intervening force was an unforeseeable event); Allen v.
Shiroma, 266 Or. 567, 514 P.2d 545, 548 (1973) (defendant not

"intervening conduct that is negligent may nevertheless be
"normal" under the Restatement formulation. Here, an intervening
act or collection of acts is an "abnormal" consequence of (or
reaction to) the situation created by UDOT if this Court—looking
at the matter in retrospect and knowing the situation existing when
the intervening conduct occurred—would regard it as extraordinary
that such an act, regardless of its unreasonableness, was done.
See Restatement § 447, comment c.
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liable to injured plaintiff where he could not have foreseen the
highly extraordinary intervening chain of causative events). UDOT
could not reasonably have foreseen at the time of adopting its
traffic control plan that McCorvey and Wright would act abnormally
and in this extraordinarily negligent manner to turn the situation,
i.e., the unswept outside lane open to 55 mph traffic, into an
injurious one. UDOT could not and should not have foreseen any
reasonable likelihood of such conduct constituting an intervening
force since it is not one of the "ordinary incidents of human life"
that UDOT should reasonably have anticipated. See Harris, 671 P.2d
at 219; Restatement § 447(a)-(c) and comments a, b, and e.
Finally,

notwithstanding

the

jury's

low

assignment

of

proportionate fault to McCorvey, challenged below in Point II, the
evidence presented at trial, when viewed in a light most favorable
to the jury's special verdict finding that McCorvey was negligent
as claimed, clearly demonstrates that his voluntary conduct in
racing through a known road hazard at high speeds was extremely
culpable.

See Restatement §§ 442(f), 447(c).

For these reasons, no reasonable jury could conclude that this
subsequent intervening force, consisting of the high-speed road
race through this resurfacing project, was not a superseding cause
of harm to McCorvey.

This Court should hold therefore that the

evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support the finding
that UDOT's negligence was a proximate cause of his injury and,
accordingly, reverse the portion of the judgment against UDOT.
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II.

VIEWING ALL THE EVIDENCE IN A LIGHT FAVORABLE
TO THE SPECIAL VERDICT FINDING McCORVEY
NEGLIGENT, NO JURY COULD FAIRLY AND REASONABLY
FIND THAT UDOT'S FAILURE TO ADOPT A TRAFFIC
CONTROL PLAN MAKING A HIGH-SPEED, SIDE-BY-SIDE
ROAD RACE IMPOSSIBLE WAS MORE CULPABLE THAN
McCORVEY'S VOLUNTARY ENGAGEMENT IN ONE DESPITE
THE KNOWN, APPARENT HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS.

In its special verdict, the jury found both McCorvey and UDOT
to be negligent in one or more of the ways claimed and, pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-39 (1992),24 found that their respective
percentages of fault were:

McCorvey 10% and UDOT 28% (R. 02521-

23). By finding McCorvey negligent, the jury accepted UDOT's claim
that

McCorvey

had

unreasonably

sped

through

this

chip

seal

resurfacing project—mimicking a flagger trying to get him to slow
down, and ignoring warning signs and regulatory speed limit and "DO
NOT PASS" signs, as well as the loose gravel he saw in both lanes—
before racing with Wright and moving too far to the left into loose
gravel on the highway shoulder.

No

jury acting

fairly and

reasonably could have then gone on to assess more fault against
UDOT than against McCorvey himself.

In making this argument, UDOT

is acutely aware of this Court's reluctance to interfere in the
factfinder's allocation of relative fault. Nonetheless, this case
presents one of those rare instances in which the Court must
intervene to set aside an apportionment of fault that is completely
contrary to the evidence and to the jury's own explicit and

24

The statute provides:
"The trial court may, and when
requested by any party shall, direct the jury, if any, to find
separate special verdicts determining the total amount of damages
sustained and the percentage of proportion of fault attributable to
each person seeking recovery and to each defendant."
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implicit factual findings concerning the parties' actions.

See,

e.g. , Garrett Freiahtlines v. Bannock Paving Co,, 121 Idaho 722, 75
P.2d 1033 (1987) (setting aside jury finding of equal fault by
negligent driver and negligent chip seal contractor).
During

this

November

1990

trial,

the

jury

saw

a very

sympathetic plaintiff, a meek, pathetic young man who faces a life
of pain, incontinency, and severe physical limitations. Yet on the
afternoon of August 7, 1986, Daniel McCorvey engaged in reckless
conduct through this highway repair project that put his own life
and his passenger's life at risk, acting like a bold, thrillseeking teenaged boy who has not yet glimpsed mortality.

He would

not back off when challenged for the lead by Wright in his big van,
though all he had to do was lift his foot from the gas pedal.
Instead, he angrily took on Wright's challenge and challenged
Wright back, daring to go even faster under dangerous conditions.
But McCorvey lost this dare, and he lost big, when he moved off the
normal lane of travel into gravel on the inside highway shoulder.
The jurors understood that McCorvey acted unreasonably under
the circumstances he faced. They rejected his story that he didn't
know what to do, that he was surprised by loose gravel in his lane
and trapped by gravel thrown from the van next to him.

They

rejected his claim that he didn't know better when he tried to
accelerate past Wright and lost control. Nonetheless, it concluded
that the State highway department's conduct was more culpable, more
blameworthy, than McCorvey's. Why?
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Because UDOT did not close

down the unswept outside lane and make it physically impossible for
McCorvey and Wright to risk life and limb in their high-speed drag
race south of milemarker 136•
The message

from

the

jury's

fault

attribution

is that

daredevils and risk takers f including reckless or grossly negligent
highway drivers, are merely victims when they get injured; they no
longer

need

to

take moral

or

legal

responsibility

consequences of their own voluntary acts.25

for the

Insteadf the State

should take the blame because it did not prevent bad drivers from
recklessly risking their lives speeding under obviously adverse
highway repair conditions.

This is exactly what plaintiff argued

to the jurors just before they deliberated. According to McCorvey,
UDOT had a duty that was "superior" to his duty to drive in a safe
and legal manner, i.e., UDOT's duty was to force him and Wright not
to race here by adopting a traffic control plan that closed the
outside right lane and confined them to only one lane of travel (R.
3008 at 50, 51, 54, 56, 63). In plaintiff's counsel's words, "We
can't allow the motorists to act for themselves.

We have to tell

them what to do and where to go and how to do it, because we are
protecting them from themselves and others."

(R. 3008 at 54).

UDOT has no such superior duty to make negligent driving, in
all of its possible forms, physically impossible.

25

Roads kill;

This view is perhaps reflective of a national trend in tort
litigation rewarding parties who refuse individual responsibility
and instead blame others for the results of their own mistakes, a
cultural change criticized recently in the popular press, e.g.,
Morrow, "A Nation of Finger Pointers," Time, Aug. 12, 1991, at 14.
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speeding kills. How could UDOT could carry out such a duty, except
by using pilot cars and speed bumps on every mile of Utah's highway
system to insure that no one drives too fast for conditions? Those
conditions vary continuously, depending on road surface and weather
and on the responsive conduct of all drivers at any given moment.
In short, it is an impossible burden for the State, and its
citizens, to accept greater blame than dangerous drivers themselves
and, with it, financial responsibility for the life threatening,
voluntary acts of every extraordinarily negligent driver on our
highways.
This Court, in setting aside the jury's finding of more fault
by UDOT than McCorvey, should do what the jury, looking at this
unfortunate man every day of this long trial, apparently could not
bring itself to do:
serious

mistakes

and

Tell Daniel McCorvey that he not only made
acted

unreasonably,

but

that

when

the

culpability of his conduct is compared to that of UDOT's conduct,
he must shoulder more blame.

If he is a victim at all, he is

primarily a victim of his own bad judgments and daredevil illusions
of invulnerability.
III. IT IS PREJUDICIAL ERROR TO GIVE A "SUDDEN
PERIL"
JURY
INSTRUCTION
UNDER
UTAH'S
COMPARATIVE FAULT SYSTEM, IN WHICH THE JURY
DETERMINES ALL ACTORS' NEGLIGENCE UNDER THE
SAME STANDARD, I.E., WHETHER THEIR CONDUCT WAS
REASONABLE UNDER ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES, AND
ALSO DETERMINES THEIR RELATIVE PROPORTIONS OF
FAULT.
ALTERNATIVELY, IT WAS PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN THIS CASE TO GIVE INSTRUCTION 33 IN
LIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED. THE TRIAL
COURT THUS ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
UDOT A NEW TRIAL ON THIS BASIS.
Over defendants' objections (Unnumbered Transcript of November
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[2]1, 1990, at 13, 18), the jury was instructed that
[a] person who is suddenly and unexpectedly
confronted with a peril arising from either the actual
presence or the appearance of imminent danger to himself
or to others is not expected nor [sic] required to use
the same judgment and prudence as required of him in
calmer and more deliberate moments.
His duty is to
exercise only the care which an ordinary prudent person
would exercise in the same situation. If at the moment
he does what appears to him to be the best thing to do,
and if his choice and manner of action are the same as
might have been followed by any ordinary prudent person
under the same conditions, he does all the law requires
of him, although in light of after events, it should
appear that a different course would have been better and
safer.
However, the presence of such an emergency or sudden
peril does not constitute such an excuse or justification
for negligence if the emergency or sudden peril was
caused by that driver's own fault.
(R. 02562—Jury Instruction 33, Addendum Item L).

UDOT's motion

for a new trial based on error in giving Instruction 33 (R. 02733;
R. 02701; Unnumbered Transcript of January 7, 1991, at 25) was
denied by the trial court (Transcript of January 7, 1991 at 37).
A.

A jury instruction on the "sudden peril"
doctrine is improper under Utah's statutory
comparative fault scheme because it (1)
erroneously implies normal standards of proof
and principles for determining negligence are
inapplicable to the actor claiming its
protections; (2) unfairly emphasizes the
evidence of that actor; and (3) improperly
tends to excuse the negligence of, and thereby
reduce the fault of, that actor in the minds
of jurors determining relative degrees of
fault of all actors•

No Utah appellate court has yet addressed the appropriateness
of any sudden peril instruction to facts arising after the 1986
enactment of section 78-27-39, which adopted a comparative fault
approach to apportionment of liability among multiple parties.
Likewise, the issue of whether the sudden peril doctrine should
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ever be instructed upon separately from the law that a person is
required to exercise due care under all the circumstances is one of
first impression in this jurisdiction•
However, Utah appellate courts have already held that other
tort doctrines, which similarly evolved under the harsh all-ornothing

contributory

negligence

system,

were

expressly

or

implicitly abolished by the Utah Legislature's abandonment of
contributory negligence nearly twenty years ago.

In Jacobsen

Constr. Co. v. Structo-Lite Engineering, 619 P.2d 306 (Utah 1980),
the jury specially found that plaintiff had assumed a known risk by
using a defectively manufactured

storage tank, but found the

relative negligence of plaintiff and defendant manufacturer to be
20% and 70%, respectively.26

Noting that section § 78-27-37 then

expressly defined a plaintiff's possible negligence as including
"assumption of the risk," this Court rejected the argument that the
jury's assumption of risk finding should result in a complete bar
to its recovery from defendant.
had

been

abolished

by the

The Court held that the doctrine

legislature's

1973 adoption

of a

comparative negligence system, in which even a negligent plaintiff
may recover if his or her negligence is less than defendant's. Id.
at

309.

The Court

agreed

that this

26

"defendant's doctrine"

Until 1986, Utah's Comparative Negligence Act required the
factfinder to apportion the amount of any negligence attributable
to the plaintiff in proportion to the amount of any negligence
attributable to the person(s) from whom recovery was sought. Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27-37 (1977) (repealed by 1986 Utah Laws ch. 1989,
§ 1, effective April 28, 1986). Since the adoption then of the
Liability Reform Act, however, the factfinder determines the
relative proportions of fault of all the actors, not of their
negligence. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37 to -39 (1992).
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restricting liability is confusing and duplicative of the concepts
of duty and negligence generally.

Id.. Utah thus joined numerous

other jurisdictions in treating the plaintiff's conduct in the face
of a known risk as subsumed by the question of whether he or she
was negligent under all the circumstances.

Id.; see Stephens v.

Henderson, 741 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah 1987) (in light of Jacobsen,
defendant not entitled to instruction that plaintiff would be
negligent if she assumed the risk of a dangerous condition). More
recently, the Utah Court of Appeals held that the "open and obvious
danger" doctrine, which is found essentially indistinguishable from
the "assumption of the risk" doctrine, was likewise extinguished by
the legislature's rejection of contributory negligence and its
adoption, in present section 78-27-37(2), of a system in which the
factfinder is to allocate liability for an injury based on its
apportionment of the parties' relative fault.

Donahue v. Durfee,

780 P.2d 1275, 1279 (Utah App. 1989). This conclusion was based in
part

on

the

statutory

definition

of

"fault"

under

Utah's

comparative fault system as "any actionable breach of legal duty,
act, or omission . . . including, but not limited to, negligence in
all its degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of risk . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37(2) (1992).
Two years after Jacobsen, this Court held that the "last clear
chance" doctrine, a "plaintiff's doctrine" under an all-or-nothing
contributory negligence system, was likewise extinguished by the
1973 adoption of a comparative negligence system.
Stewart, 658 P.2d 591, 599 (Utah 1982).
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Dixon v.

Finding no error in the

trial court's refusal to give plaintiff's "last clear chance" jury
instruction, this Court concluded that the doctrine is subsumed
within comparative negligence; thus, whether the defendant had the
last clear chance to avoid injury to plaintiff is just one of the
many factors to be weighed in the factfinder's comparison of
negligence required under former section 78-27-38. Id. at 598 n.7.
The sudden peril instruction is also a "plaintiff's doctrine"
that developed under the traditional contributory negligence system
to soften the harsh and inflexible result of total victory or
unconditional defeat compelled by that system. Like the last clear
chance doctrine favorable to plaintiffs that was done away with in
Dixon, the reasons for the sudden peril doctrine were extinguished
when the legislature abandoned the old contributory negligence
system.

This Court should likewise hold that whether a plaintiff

was faced with a sudden peril excusing his or her conduct is
subsumed into the factfinder's evaluation of whether plaintiff
exercised due care under all the circumstances.

In other words,

the existence of a sudden peril and plaintiff's response to it
should

be

just

two

factors

among many

that weigh

into the

determination of whether the plaintiff's conduct was negligent and
what proportion of relative fault is attributable to that conduct.
A

sudden

peril

instruction

adds

nothing

necessary

to

established law applicable to assess the reasonableness of an
actor's conduct, i.e., did he or she exercise due care under all
the circumstances, the standard for assessing negligence given to
the jury in Instructions 21-23.

On the contrary, the giving of a
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separate

sudden

peril

instruction

confusingly

suggests

that

different principles, including a higher standard of proof, apply
in assessing the reasonableness of the conduct of the actor
claiming to have reacted to an emergency.

It also unfairly

emphasizes evidence favorable to the party seeking its benefits.
For these reasons, the sudden peril instruction has been banned in
Mississippi,

a

pure

comparative

negligence

state,

Knapp

v.

Stanford, 392 So.2d 196, 198 (Miss. 1981), and in Montana, a
modified comparative negligence state, Simonson v. White, 220 Mont.
14, 713 P.2d 983, 990 (1986); see also Miller v. Eichhorn, 426
M.W.2d 641, 644 (Iowa App. 1988) (questioning appropriateness and
purpose of sudden peril instruction after adoption of modified
comparative negligence); Templeton v. Smith, 88 Or. App. 266, 744
P.2d 1325, 1326 (1987) (expressing doubt that it should ever be
given

in

comparative

an

ordinary
negligence

automobile
system).

accident
See

case

in

generally

Comparative Fault §§ 1:11, 4:8 (2d ed. 1987).

modified

H.

Woods,

Furthermore, where

the factfinder's role is to assess relative proportions of fault
attributable to multiple parties, as under sections 77-27-37 to 39, the instruction

strongly and unfairly

suggests

that any

negligence by plaintiff is excused or justified—and thus less
culpable—when the jury apportions all actors' relative fault, if
plaintiff faced a sudden and unexpected peril he or she did not
cause.
In light of the superfluous, misleading, and prejudicial
nature of the sudden peril instruction, UDOT requests this Court to
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hold that it was reversible error for the trial court to give
Instruction 33 and, thus, it was an abuse of discretion for the
trial court to deny UDOT's motion for a new trial.
B.

Even if a sudden peril instruction is proper
in a comparative fault system, it was
prejudicial error to give it in this case
because McCorvey was not confronted with any
sudden emergency that was not the result of
his own negligent course of conduct.

Prior to adoption of a comparative fault system, Utah cases
held it was not error to give a sudden peril instruction if there
was some evidence to support a party's claim of nonnegligence on
his or her part in creating any emergency faced.

Christiansen v.

Utah Transit Authority. 649 P.2d 42, 47 (Utah 1982); Hillier v.
Lamborn, 740 P.2d 300, 302-03 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d
1277 (1987); see Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170, 172-73 (Utah
1983); Keller v. Shelley, 551 P.2d 513, 514 (1976).

However, a

sudden peril instruction is improper if the evidence compels the
conclusion that any emergency encountered was the result of the
negligent conduct of the person facing it.

Redd v. Airway Motor

Coach Lines, Inc., 104 Utah 221, 137 P.2d 347, 378 (1943); see Lee
v. Mitchell Funeral Home Ambulance Serv., 606 P.2d 259, 261 (Utah
1980); Keller, 551 P.2d at 514; Solt v. Godfrey, 25 Utah 2d 210,
479 P.2d 474, 477 (1971) (the instruction "tends to lead the jury
to a belief that the Court thought there was a sudden emergency
presented to a careful driver free from any negligence.").
Here, the evidence of what took place just before McCorvey
accelerated out of control compels the conclusion that there either
was no sudden peril or that, even if there was, it resulted from
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his own negligence.

He had experience driving through numerous

chip sealing projects and had driven on nine miles of newly
resurfaced highway through this project, past heavy equipment, a
repair

crew,

a

flagger,

signs warning

of

loose

gravel

and

recommending a 25 mph speed to avoid damage, and eighteen "DO NOT
PASS" signs.

He testified he was having trouble controlling his

car because of the loose gravel in the left lane from the time he
passed the Cove Fort interchange at milemarker 135 until he left
the roadway, approximately 8/10ths of a mile further south.

Once

Wright came up close behind him, he knew that there was gravel
being thrown up by his own car.

He saw that the loo^e gravel in

the right lane was thick and decided not to pull over there.

He

knew the loose gravel he saw in the right lane made it dangerous
for Wright to pass him on the right, so he tried to prevent that
maneuver. When Wright was alongside him, McCorvey knew that gravel
was being thrown up by the speeding van and he heard the loose
gravel turned over by the Honda rattling loudly in his own wheel
wheels.

Nonetheless, he continued to race to get ahead of Wright

and accelerated even more to what his own expert calculated was 6065 mph, well in excess of the posted speed limit, before losing
control in the thick gravel on the shoulder of the left lane.
If McCorvey was travelling 55 mph from milemarker 135 down to
the accident site, he would have had approximately 52.3 seconds in
which to deliberate, evaluate, and take appropriate action and
decelerate to a reasonable speed to keep his car under control in
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the loose gravel,27

Even the shorter time it took for Wright to

pull up alongside the Honda, for Page to shout angrily and make an
obscene gesture at the van occupants, and then for McCorvey to
accelerate before moving over into the excess gravel on the inside
highway shoulder was long enough to disqualify the situation he
faced from being one of "sudden" peril*

See Tansy v. Morgan, 604

P.2d 626, 628 (Ariz. 1979) (peril not "sudden" since car hit was in
plain view for sufficient length of time to allow other driver to
stop); Temple ton, 744 P. 2d at 1326 (reversing a jury verdict for
defendant based on erroneous giving of sudden peril instruction
where there was time for any emergency to have been anticipated).
Thus, it was erroneous to give Instruction 33.
Even if the Court concludes there was sufficient evidence that
McCorvey was "suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with a sudden
peril," it was still error to give Instruction 33 in this case. His
own testimony and that of his experts compels the conclusion that
any emergency situation he faced while driving in the loose gravel
was the result of his own negligent conduct in racing through this
known area of loose gravel, then vying to get ahead of the Wright
van by accelerating even more, instead of simply taking his foot
off the gas.
Instruction 33.

In such circumstances, it was erroneous to give
See Keller, 551 P.2d at 514; Salt, 479 P.2d at

477; Redd, 137 P.2d at 138.
Although the jury proceeded to find that McCorvey was indeed
27

McCorvey, of course, claimed he was going much slower then,
which would have given him even more time to appreciate his
situation.
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negligent/ the trial court's error was nonetheless harmful under
Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because Instruction 33
unduly emphasized evidence favorable to McCorvey's claim that he
was "trapped." The instruction erroneously describes the existence
of a sudden peril as "an excuse or justification for negligence/'
when the gist of the doctrine is that it is not necessarily
unreasonable, i.e,

is not necessarily negligence at all, to make

an unwise choice in an emergency situation.

In this way, the

instruction strongly suggested that it would be appropriate for the
jury to find McCorvey less culpable when apportioning fault, even
though it found him negligent, if a sudden emergency existed as
"such an excuse or justification for negligence." Furthermore, by
seating that "the presence of such an emergency or sudden peril
does not constitute such an excuse or justification for negligence
if the emergency or sudden peril was caused by that driver's own
fault," Instruction 33 suggests that any negligence by McCorvey was
excused or justified, and thus less culpable, if he did not cause
the emergency, regardless of who or what did.

The jury did indeed

find his conduct less at fault than UDOT's.

As discussed above

under Point II, this allocation of fault is unreasonable and
unsupported by the evidence, a probable result of the erroneous and
confusing messages in Instruction 33.
For these reasons, there is a reasonable likelihood that,
absent the error in giving this sudden peril instruction, the jury
would have returned a special verdict more favorable to UDOT on the
fault

apportionment

issue by

finding
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it less

at

fault than

McCorvey, leading to no liability under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38
(1992).

See Crookston, 817 P.2d at 796-97.

Because there is no

reasonable basis in law or fact for the trial court's denial of
UDOT's motion for new trial on the basis of this prejudicial error,
the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion.
at 805.

Id.

This Court should, therefore, order a new trial.
CONCLUSION

For any one of the alternative bases set out in Points IA, IB
and II, UDOT respectfully requests this Court to reverse that
portion of the judgment below entered against it because of the
legal insufficiency of the evidence of proximate causation or of
greater proportionate fault by UDOT.

If the Court rejects those

arguments, but agrees under Point III that it was prejudicial error
for the trial court to give the sudden peril instruction and,
consequently,

that the trial court

abused

its discretion in

refusing UDOT a new trial on this basis, UDOT requests that the
order denying a new trial be reversed and this case remanded to the
trial court for that purpose.
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